Who Knew? The Network Concealing the IDF's Equipment Shortage After October 7
A growing investigation into the officials, nonprofits, and insiders who ignored the cries for helmets, vests, and night vision when soldiers needed them most.
This post will be updated regularly as part of an ongoing effort to map the individuals, institutions, and decision-making failures that contributed to the critical lack of equipment for IDF soldiers in the wake of the October 7th, 2023 massacre. We aim to identify not only who was responsible for the logistical breakdowns, but also who may have known about the shortages and failed to act. This includes military officials, government procurement authorities, nonprofit executives, and public-facing figures who dismissed or downplayed urgent calls for basic gear such as helmets, ceramic vests, and night vision. If you have verifiable information that could contribute to this investigation, please get in touch.
Ynet (January 2020):
An internal audit conducted by the IDF Ombudsman in August 2018 and reported publicly in Ynet in January 2020 exposed critical readiness failures within the 319th Division, the IDF’s largest and first-response force on the northern border. Despite being the primary unit tasked with entering combat in the event of war with Hezbollah or Iranian forces in Syria, the division was found to be alarmingly underprepared.
Key deficiencies include a severe shortage of combat vehicles, with 52% deemed unfit for use, and a 20% shortfall in weapons and night-vision equipment. Nearly half of the division’s Merkava Mark 4 tanks and 100 communication systems had been diverted to distant training units over 350 km away, leaving operational units without essential hardware. Many tanks were described as “worn out,” severely undermining their combat value.
The division also lacked basic logistical capacity. Only 54 of 90 critical logistics and maintenance positions were staffed following the dismissal of over 5,000 NCOs in recent years. The medical unit had no commanding officer or deputy for nearly a year, and dozens of trucks and armored vehicles were found rusting, uncovered, or otherwise nonfunctional, with 68 vehicles exposed to the elements and over 1,500 trucks classified as faulty, with 60 more deemed unfit each month. Additionally, only 34% of oil tankers and a third of military cranes were operational.
The report noted that more than NIS 70 million in budget shortfalls had blocked implementation of a NIS 300 million “New Life” logistics improvement plan. Though the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit claimed that the division remained “extremely fit for war,” the audit findings, paired with political instability and postponed military decisions, paint a dire picture of readiness at one of Israel’s most crucial frontline units.
Israel Hayom (May 2023):
In a May 2023 investigation by Israel Hayom, IDF soldiers serving in Judea and Samaria reported being sent on missions without adequate protective body armor due to a severe shortage of ceramic vests. The problem, which affects multiple units beyond that region, stems from limited supply at the brigade level, prompting a rotation system in which ceramic plates are shared between soldiers—even during active operations and guard duty.
Soldiers described the situation as dangerous and absurd, with one source likening it to "sending a soldier for a stakeout with a plastic gun." Frustration was compounded by broader questions about budget priorities, including government spending on Haredi institutions while basic battlefield equipment remained in short supply.
The IDF, in response, denied knowledge of any missions where troops lacked ceramic protection but acknowledged uneven distribution. The military stated it was addressing the issue through additional procurement and emphasized that troops are not deployed on missions requiring protective gear unless they are properly equipped.
The situation described in May 2023, months before the October 7 massacre and the full-scale war that followed, raises serious concerns about the IDF’s logistical preparedness. If soldiers were already rotating life-saving ceramic vests during routine operations in Judea and Samaria due to a documented shortage, it is a fair and reasonable assumption that the problem would not only persist but likely worsen once the military was forced to rapidly mobilize hundreds of thousands of reservists after October 7. The IDF's claim that no soldiers are sent into danger without proper gear rings hollow against the backdrop of pre-war deficiencies that had already placed troops at unnecessary risk.
Daniel Hagari, IDF Spokesperson:
Whether justified or not, IDF Spokesperson Daniel Hagari's October 9th, 2023 statement that “the IDF is not experiencing a shortage of equipment” does not hold up against overwhelming evidence, both contemporaneous and subsequent, that frontline troops were indeed lacking critical gear. At the time he made this assertion, reservists and active-duty soldiers were already sharing urgent messages on social media and with journalists, pleading for ceramic vests, helmets, uniforms, tactical gear, and even basic rations. Hagari’s categorical denial that “anyone who is conducting operational activities in the IDF is provided with combat equipment” directly contradicted the firsthand accounts of units deployed to the Gaza envelope and northern borders who documented receiving outdated or insufficient protective gear. While it is possible Hagari intended to reassure the public and prevent panic, the blanket nature of his claim amounted to a falsehood that undermined public trust. In hindsight, given how many private initiatives had to step in to equip soldiers, it is clear that his denial of shortages was not only inaccurate—it delayed life-saving aid from reaching those who needed it most.
Calcalist, October 17th, 2023:
In an October 17th article from Calcalist, the IDF publicly reversed its earlier denials and admitted for the first time that there were “gaps” in essential combat equipment. At the start of the war, military spokespeople had insisted that there was no shortage. But as complaints from soldiers flooded in—particularly from those mobilized under emergency reserve orders—a senior military official acknowledged that the unprecedented turnout, with some units experiencing 130 to 140 percent attendance, had overwhelmed available supplies. The Ministry of Defense responded by launching a large-scale emergency procurement effort, including the immediate import of 17,000 ceramic plates. Brig. Gen. Daniel Hagari admitted the logistical breakdowns, stating, “Not everything will be perfect, but we are learning the situation quickly and implementing solutions.” Soldiers reported receiving outdated gear, including decades-old helmets, and many demanded modern tactical alternatives that were either unavailable or slow to arrive.
However, the IDF’s attempt to frame the crisis as a sudden issue driven exclusively by reservists is unconvincing. Well before the October 7 attack, standing IDF units were already grappling with dangerous supply shortfalls. A May 2023 investigation by Israel Hayom revealed that active-duty soldiers in Judea and Samaria were rotating ceramic vests due to a lack of inventory—during peacetime. This critical detail undermines the military’s narrative that the shortages were a byproduct of emergency mobilization. If full-time combat units lacked sufficient protective equipment in May, then the reserve shortage was not a surprise. It was the inevitable result of years of neglect and logistical mismanagement. The war did not create this crisis. It simply exposed it.
The IDF further attempted to deflect criticism by claiming that donated protective gear posed safety risks. According to the Calcalist article, the Ministry of Defense said “dozens of shipments” of ceramic vests and plates were tested and found defective, allegedly endangering soldiers’ lives. Yet the military provided no detail on the testing criteria. What standards were used—Israeli, NATO, or American NIJ? What specific failure modes were identified? Were these plates unable to stop standard rifle rounds, or were they flagged for cosmetic or bureaucratic reasons? More importantly, did the Ministry apply these same tests to its own aging stock, including vests from 1997 and helmets from the Yom Kippur War era, which soldiers were reportedly issued? The article offers no indication that it did. In the absence of transparency, this explanation appears more like a pretext to discourage outside assistance than a legitimate quality control concern.
If the government intends to argue that privately donated equipment was subpar, it must release the data to prove it—and hold its own inventory to the same standard. Until then, its claims ring hollow. Soldiers were sent into combat with insufficient protection. The Ministry scrambled to cover the shortfall only after the problem became impossible to ignore. And rather than own up to a systemic failure, officials chose to shift the blame to civilian donors, reservists, and even the soldiers themselves. This is not accountability. It is obfuscation, and it comes at the expense of those risking their lives on the front lines.
Michel Yanko:
In the critical days and weeks following the October 7th, 2023 massacre, Maj. Gen. Michel Yanko—the head of the IDF Technology and Logistics Directorate—repeatedly downplayed the scale and severity of equipment shortages faced by Israel’s reserve and active-duty soldiers. Despite widespread reports from the field describing a desperate lack of helmets, ceramic vests, night vision gear, and other essential combat equipment, Yanko insisted publicly that the IDF logistics system was fully operational and sufficiently resourced. At an October 10th press briefing, he told reporters, “Civilians [are] welcome to donate funds for ‘treats’ via the Association for the Wellbeing of Israel’s Soldiers, but the army would supply the necessary equipment.” The message was clear: if soldiers lacked basic protection, the fault did not lie with the military.
But reality on the ground painted a starkly different picture. Countless reserve units were called up without access to ceramic vests, night optics, or even functional helmets—many were forced to rely on public donations and grassroots initiatives to fill the gaps. Still, Maj. Gen. Yanko doubled down. In the same October 10th press engagement, he declared, “The Yamachim were ready. Does everyone get our best equipment like the recon units? No, we didn’t intend for that… We did not intend to give all 300,000 [reserve] soldiers ceramic vests. Everyone who will be in combat has a ceramic vest.” This statement revealed a deeply flawed and narrow definition of "combat" readiness, as many frontline reserve units were not classified as elite, yet were immediately deployed to high-risk zones.
Later that month, on October 30th, Yanko again attempted to project confidence, stating, “The logistics, technology, maintenance and medical units in the IDF are strong... working continuously and resolutely to provide an optimal logistical infrastructure for the regular and reserve troops—until victory.” Yet even by then, independent reports, firsthand accounts from soldiers, and visual documentation contradicted his claims. Many viewed his statements as less a reflection of fact than an effort to preserve institutional credibility and deflect growing public outrage.
Michel Yanko’s public messaging after October 7 was not just a communications failure; it was a case study in institutional denial. His insistence that the logistics system was functioning smoothly concealed the profound breakdown in readiness and provisioning that left thousands of Israeli soldiers exposed. By portraying critical donor-driven efforts as auxiliary or superfluous, he misled the public and undermined the urgency of grassroots support efforts that in many cases saved lives.
Udi Adam:
Maj. Gen. Udi Adam’s comments, published in an October 30th article, reveal a staggering ignorance of basic material science and a callous disregard for soldier safety. “My impression is that there is no shortage,” he says, twice, dismissing what countless soldiers have reported and what any responsible logistics officer should know. Ceramic plates and Kevlar do not last forever. A ceramic plate from 1997 or even 2007 is not protective gear. It is a liability. Ceramic degrades over time, especially with exposure to temperature shifts and repeated use. Kevlar loses its ballistic integrity when exposed to moisture, sunlight, and simply through the aging process. Yet Adam, who once led the IDF’s Technology and Logistics Division, claims this is all a matter of preference, saying, “There are all sorts of calls from those who want more, or who don’t like what they have.” As if soldiers are making style choices, not fighting for their lives with substandard equipment.
His statement, “equipment is equipment,” is not just false. It is dangerous. A helmet or vest made decades ago is not the same as modern ballistic gear. For Adam, who held top logistical roles and even served as director general of the Ministry of Defense, to ignore this reality is indefensible. He continues, “I didn’t get the impression that it was lacking,” as though his brief tour as a reservist driver overrides the lived experience of soldiers pleading for upgraded protection. Either he is unwilling to listen or incapable of understanding. In a war zone, both are equally disqualifying. This is not a minor oversight. It is a profound institutional failure dressed up as willful denial.
Adam further doubles down with breathtaking arrogance, stating, “I know the system and I was also the director general of the Ministry of Defense: there is a shortage of equipment that people want – one received an old vest, so he says he doesn't have one, but there is really no shortage – neither food nor equipment.” This is precisely the Orwellian logic that endangers lives. An old vest that cannot stop a bullet is not equipment. Dismissing legitimate concerns because a box was technically checked is how soldiers end up unprotected in the field. Adam’s definition of “no shortage” amounts to gaslighting the very people risking their lives. His familiarity with the system is not a credential. It is an indictment.
Nadav Padan:
Maj. Gen. (Res.) Nadav Padan served as the National Director of Friends of the IDF (FIDF) until July 23, 2025, when he was appointed CEO of the organization. Before his role at FIDF, Padan held significant command responsibilities within the Israel Defense Forces, most notably as head of Central Command. In that position, he oversaw military operations across a critical region of the country. Following his departure from Central Command, he was succeeded by Maj. Gen. Tamir Yadai, who later ascended to lead the IDF Ground Forces—placing both men at the center of decisions regarding soldier readiness, training, and equipment in the years leading up to and following the October 7th attacks. Tamir Yadai serves as the Deputy Chief of Staff of the IDF as of July 24th, 2025.
On October 18th, 2023, as Israeli soldiers scrambled for basic gear and families frantically tried to fill the gap, Nadav Padan chose to dismiss their pleas as mere "noise." With breathtaking arrogance, he chastised those responding to urgent needs from the front, saying, “instead of helping, they are disturbing, they are stealing the time that the leadership doesn't have.” He insisted that civilians with firsthand knowledge of dire shortages were a problem, not the shortages themselves. Padan called on donors to “listen to the brief and to the list that’s been published by the FIDF,” claiming it was “the real voice of the needs of the IDF.” But the real voices, the ones screaming from the battlefield, told a very different story. His words weren’t just tone deaf; they were a betrayal of the very soldiers he purported to support.
On December 27th, 2023, Nadav Padan appeared on a YouTube donor briefing and delivered one of the most condescending and detached performances of the war. With a straight face, he claimed that “almost 100% of the soldiers have the equipment that the IDF planned them” (sic) and dismissed the widespread outcry over equipment failures as minor “gaps.” He went even further, mocking soldiers who were pleading for updated tactical helmets by comparing them to “a college son that asks for a new car.” Soldiers weren’t asking for luxuries. They were asking not to die with gear older than they are. For Padan to publicly ridicule frontline troops, many of them reservists thrown into war with barely functioning protection, reveals a staggering disconnect from the battlefield reality.
Padan insisted there were “over 10,000 new tactical helmets” sitting in IDF storage. That claim alone should have sparked outrage. Because if it were true, it would mean that the IDF logistics system knowingly left thousands of soldiers in harm’s way while life-saving equipment sat unused. In truth, most reservists were issued expired helmets, some stamped from 1978 and 1979, far beyond the accepted 5 to 10-year shelf life of ballistic headgear. Rather than advocate for soldiers or push for reform, Padan chose to insult them, downplay their needs, and reassure donors with fiction. His performance was not just misleading. It was an abdication of responsibility in the face of real suffering.
Tamir Yadai:
In a striking display of institutional hostility toward grassroots support efforts, Maj. Gen. Tamir Yadai, commander of Israel’s ground forces and now Deputy Chief of Staff, issued a directive in July 2024 ordering “utmost enforcement and maximum punishment” against soldiers who accepted donated equipment, even from their own parents. This threat came at a time when hundreds of thousands of reserve troops were still lacking critical protective gear such as modern helmets, ceramic vests, and night vision equipment. These were items the IDF had failed to provide at scale in the aftermath of October 7.
Rather than acknowledging the overwhelming evidence of logistical failure, Yadai framed these grassroots efforts as violations of IDF values. A memo circulated through military channels stated that such donations "go against the values of the Israel Defense Forces" and that accepting them, even when they meet or exceed military specifications, was punishable. This policy criminalized the very lifeline that kept many soldiers safe, targeting those who had no choice but to turn to civilians for lifesaving gear.
The disconnect between the IDF command and the lived reality of soldiers in the field could not have been more glaring. While the military invoked concerns about safety standards to justify its crackdown, nonprofits providing the gear, many of them run by Israelis and diaspora Jews with deep logistical expertise, openly stated that the true danger lay in the substandard equipment issued by the army itself, including dented helmets from the 1970s.
Yadai’s order not only failed to resolve the underlying crisis of supply failure but effectively punished soldiers for surviving it. In doing so, it elevated bureaucratic loyalty over battlefield readiness and sent a chilling message: preserving institutional control mattered more than protecting Israeli lives.
Morey Levovitz, FIDF National Board Chairman:
In a July 26, 2024 internal email to the Friends of the IDF (FIDF) board, National Chairman Morey Levovitz openly admitted that the organization “did not engage” in supplying essential military equipment to Israeli soldiers during the emergency period following October 7. Levovitz framed this refusal as a principled decision, citing FIDF’s charter and claiming that high-level IDF officials had clearly stated they neither requested nor welcomed such assistance. Rather than express regret or concern over failing to meet soldiers’ urgent needs, Levovitz used the moment to defend the organization’s inaction, sharing an IDF memo threatening disciplinary action against troops who accepted donated gear, as if to vindicate FIDF’s abstention. The tone of the message suggested not shame, but satisfaction in having abstained from what many considered to be the most urgent and basic expression of solidarity with those risking their lives on the front lines.
Yaniv Asor:
Brigadier General Yaniv Asor, who served as the head of the Human Resources Division of the IDF, was widely identified as the primary liaison between the IDF and Friends of the IDF (FIDF). During his tenure, FIDF repeatedly cited unnamed senior military officials to justify its refusal to provide essential gear such as vests, helmets, and tactical equipment to frontline reservists, even as urgent shortages were being documented in real time. While it is clear that Asor played a central role in shaping FIDF’s understanding of IDF policies and needs, it remains uncertain whether he directly instructed the organization to disseminate misleading statements regarding the availability of equipment. His precise involvement in FIDF’s public messaging, whether it was shaped by bureaucratic caution, political pressure, or intentional deflection, has yet to be clarified.
Walla, December 4th, 2023:
In a December 4, 2023 report by Walla, senior IDF Armored Corps reservist officers voiced harsh criticism over the military’s persistent failure to equip its forces properly, even 60 days into the Gaza campaign. Despite public support and significant private donations, the IDF’s Logistics Division was accused of providing “empty promises” through its special hotline, offering little real assistance to reservist field commanders on the ground. One officer lamented the army’s ongoing unpreparedness and lack of transparency toward its own soldiers, many of whom were urgently mobilized from civilian life without proper gear.
What resonated most was the officer’s stark warning that “ultimately, what will be remembered from this war is the lack of equipment and how difficult it was to achieve our objectives because of this.” He described the situation as “truly disheartening,” especially given that certain tank-specific supplies cannot be purchased in stores. The officer called for a thorough investigation into the IDF’s logistical failures once the war concludes, underscoring how these systemic issues undermined both morale and mission readiness on the front lines.
Gil Burshtein, Ministry of Defense:
In the fall of 2023, amid growing public concern over equipment shortages in the IDF, Gil Burshtein, Head of the Donation Center at the Israeli Ministry of Defense, responded to a civilian supporter who had offered to donate modern ballistic helmets. His reply was terse and bureaucratic:
“Good morning
the helmet is not an approved item for the IDF. can't provide you with a legal advice, I do know that a lot of US civilians had funded military equipment donations.
Thank you for your support
Gil Burshtein
Head of the donation center
Israeli Ministry Of Defense”
At a time when reservists were already reporting severe shortages and being issued outdated gear, this response raised serious concerns. While Burshtein does not make an explicit legal judgment, his invocation of “IDF approval” sidesteps the core issue: hundreds of soldiers were deployed with helmets more than a decade old, many of which no longer met modern ballistic standards. While it cannot be proven what Burshtein knew, it is reasonable to assume—given his role and the visibility of the crisis—that he was aware of these deficiencies. His email reflects a pattern of institutional evasion, where regulatory language is used to reject life-saving aid while the military fails to meet its own standards. The result is a dangerous status quo in which frontline soldiers pay the price for bureaucratic inflexibility.
Aharon Haliva:
In 2020, 80 weapons were stolen from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), highlighting a broader trend of increasing theft of military equipment. During a Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee hearing, chaired by MK Zvi Hauser, it was emphasized that such thefts undermine public trust and security, as stolen weapons often end up in the hands of criminals and create a dangerous power imbalance in certain areas. Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliva, then Head of the IDF’s Operations Directorate, confirmed the issue was severe enough to warrant focused attention from the Chief of Staff. In response, surprise inspections were conducted across 52 military bases, and the inspection rate was raised to 30 per month from the previous 6–8, with failing bases flagged for command-level review.
While much of the public focus has been on firearms, the hearing revealed that other types of equipment were also at risk. Specifically, there was a rising trend in the theft of ammunition, explosives, and demolition materials—such as bullets and explosive charges—unlike firearms, which were reportedly being stolen less frequently due to stricter base regulations and better-secured armories. For instance, the new IDF policy prohibited support soldiers from taking weapons home and restricted combat soldiers from doing so during long leave periods. Nonetheless, the theft of 38 weapons from the Gibor base in a single incident led to the high 2020 figure, emphasizing that many storage facilities had not yet been upgraded to new security standards.
Local leaders, especially in the Golan Heights, expressed concern that the IDF had removed weapons from emergency readiness units in civilian settlements without providing proper replacements. Golan Regional Council head Chaim Rokach criticized the move, arguing that well-equipped local defense units are essential in high-risk border communities. Haliva acknowledged the tension between securing weapons and maintaining accessibility but insisted that any storage solutions must balance criminal threats with preparedness for terrorism. MKs from across the political spectrum voiced frustration with the situation, demanding a comprehensive national policy to restore deterrence and ensure law and order—starting with tightening control over all types of military equipment.
Brig. General Elon Glassberg, IDF Surgeon General:
On November 1st, 2023, at the request of Friends of the IDF (FIDF), Brigadier General Elon Glassberg, the IDF Surgeon General, appeared in a video that served as a carefully crafted piece of propaganda. In the video, Glassberg praised FIDF for responding quickly and claimed their donations were providing the most essential, lifesaving items to Israeli soldiers. He emphasized that the equipment would save lives and prevent casualties, presenting FIDF as a critical partner in the war effort. However, the visuals accompanying his remarks told a different story. The footage prominently featured non-essential items such as Listerine, shampoo, and soap—basic hygiene products that, while helpful, are far from the battlefield gear that soldiers urgently need. The inclusion of these images undermined the video’s core message and raised serious questions about the accuracy of FIDF’s marketing and the integrity of Glassberg’s endorsement. The video appears to have been produced not to inform, but to protect FIDF’s public image in the face of growing scrutiny over its failure to supply critical protective equipment to frontline units.